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Toward a Broad Reading of Implied
Powers of State Public Utility
Commissions: Combating a Legacy of
Laissez Faire
Terrance J. Fitzpatrick*
Public utility regulation is in ferment. Public utility industries,
which were marked by stability two decades ago, are now in a state
of flux. The upheaval in the electric and gas industries is part of a
broader problem-the national energy crisis. Natural gas prices have
risen since 1969, due in large part to increases in prices of imported
oil.' Rates for electricity have increased rapidly because of fuel price
increases and escalating costs of constructing new generating plants,
particularly nuclear generating plants.' In the telecommunications
industry, competition has flourished as a result of technological ad-
vances and decisions of the Federal Communications Commission
and federal courts.
These developments are challenging public utility regulators to
adopt innovative policies and procedures to assure adequate utility
service at reasonable rates." Because regulatory statutes are drafted
broadly, authority to implement these new policies is usually not
contained in the express language of regulatory statutes. Regulators
and courts must determine the reach of the agencies' "implied
powers."
* J.D., University of Dayton School of Law. Counsel to Commissioner Bill Shane, Penn-
sylvania Public Utility Commission. The author wishes to thank Daniel P. Delaney, Esquire,
for his helpful comments. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
I. See H. Trebing, Public Utility Regulation. A Case Study in the Debate Over Ef-
fectiveness of Economic Regulation, 18 J. oF ECON. ISSUEs 223, 231-33 (1984).
2. Id. at 229-31. See also Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retro-
spect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), affid, Computer and
Communications Industry Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (deregulating tele-
phone equipment); United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982) affd sub nom Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (approving
divestiture of AT&T).
4. To cite two examples of these innovations, regulators have sought to intervene in
construction projects of electric utilities and have attempted to compel gas and electric utilities
to promote energy conservation. See infra Part Ill.
This article will examine the scope of implied powers of state
public utility commissions. History reveals that when regulatory
agencies were in their infancy, both state and federal courts inter-
preted implied powers very narrowly to minimize the impact of regu-
latory legislation on property rights of regulated industries. This re-
luctance was consistent with the laissez faire attitude of the judiciary
during this period. After the New Deal, federal courts changed their
approach and interpreted implied powers liberally to effectuate pur-
poses of regulatory legislation. State courts, however, have generally
continued to construe implied powers narrowly, often relying upon
pre-New Deal precedents.
The narrow interpretation of implied powers of state public util-
ity commissions hampers the ability of these commissions to respond
to fluctuating conditions in utility industries, elevates the interest of
utilities over the interest of the public, and deprives the public of
benefits of effective government. State courts should reject anti-
quated precedents and adopt the federal approach of liberally con-
struing implied powers.
I. Federal and Pennsylvania Court Decisions Construing Implied
Powers Before the New Deal.
An understanding of current judicial attitudes toward implied
powers of administrative agencies requires a knowledge of history.
Administrative agencies were created to cope with profound changes
in society caused by the industrial revolution. Necessary reforms
could not be accomplished by creating rights through legislation and
then relying upon courts to enforce those rights. Justice Felix Frank-
furter succinctly remarked:
Profound new forces call for social inventions, or fresh adapta-
tions of old experience. The 'great society' with its permeating
influence of technology, large-scale industry, and progressive ur-
banization, presses its problems; the history of political and so-
cial liberty admonishes us of its lessons . . . . The vast changes
wrought by industry during the nineteenth century inevitably
gave rise to a steady extension of legal control over economic
and social interests. At first, state intervention manifested itself
largely through specific legislative directions, depending for en-
forcement generally upon the rigid, cumbersome and ineffective
machinery of the criminal law. By the pressure of experience,
legislative regulation of economic and social activities has turned
to administrative instruments.
5. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 614, 617-18
(1927).
While the ascendance of administrative agencies may have
seemed inevitable to some, much of the legal establishment opposed
it. Lawyers who were weaned on the common law took a dim view of
legislation in general and of reform legislation in particular.6 The
disdain for reform legislation grew out of a preference for individual-
ism and private property rights which was rooted in the common
law.7 Lawyers often disfavored government interference with rights
which they viewed as "natural" and "absolute," and they resented
policies which were contrary to interests of other members of their
social class.8
Courts vented their hostility for social legislation in two ways.
First, they refused to accept social legislation into the body of law by
declaring it unconstitutional.9 Second, when they did accept this leg-
islation, they did so grudgingly by construing it narrowly to mini-
mize its impact on common law principles.1"
In order to declare social legislation unconstitutional, courts
read the economic theory of laissez faire into the broad language of
the constitution. 1 Legislation designed to protect disadvantaged
groups in society was nullified because it violated individuals' consti-
tutional right to "liberty of contract," which courts held was pro-
tected under the due process clause. 2 Professor Lawrence Tribe de-
scribed this period in history as one of "implied limitations" on the
legislative power of government,'" with the limitations defined by
reference to common law principles.' Thus, the common law princi-
ples which the judiciary favored were elevated to the status of consti-
tutional law.
The flavor of constitutional decisions of this period is best cap-
tured in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v.
New York.' 5 New York had passed a law which established a maxi-
6. See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Right to Seek Workmen's Compensation, 15 RUTGERS
L. REV. 491 (1961); B. Twiss. LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 12-13 (1942). The disdain of
the common law lawyer for legislation is apparent in an article published early in this century
which states, "Statutory law tends to become technical and arbitrary. 'Judge-made law,' on
the other hand, tends to conform itself to the principles of common sense, right reason and
justice." Hornblower, A Century of "Judge-Made" Law, 7 COL. L. REV. 453, 462 (1907).
7. See B. Twiss, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908). For
a discussion of the relationship between economic and constitutional theory, see Lerner, The
Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668 (1932).
10. Pound, supra note 9.
II. B. Twiss, supra note 6, at 14-17; W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 44
(1962).
12. See generally Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1908).
13. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 427-42 (1978).
14. Id. at 432-33.
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For other examples of constitutional decisions during this pe-
riod, see Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a state law prohibiting "yellow
dog" contracts); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (nullifying a state law restricting the
mum work week of sixty hours for bakers. In Lochner, the Supreme
Court invalidated the law under a theory that it violated "liberty of
contract" between bakers and their employers. The Court stated that
statutes regulating hours of work "are mere meddlesome interfer-
ences with the rights of the individual.' 6 In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes criticized the majority for reading
personal beliefs into the broad language of the constitution. In his
view, such an approach was improper, because "a constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of pater-
nalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of lais-
sez faire."'
1 7
Social legislation which was conceded to be constitutional was
interpreted narrowly under the doctrine that statutes in derogation
of the common law must be strictly construed.' 8 This canon of con-
struction enabled courts to limit change which social legislation
could effect and it clearly reflected the judiciary's desire to maintain
the status quo.
The judicial preference for common law principles over legisla-
tion, manifested in a narrow construction of reform statutes, is ap-
parent in early court decisions construing the scope of implied pow-
ers granted to regulatory agencies.
The earliest federal court decisions interpreting implied powers
involve the first federal regulatory agency-the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC). In Cincinnati, N.O., & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
ICC,' the Supreme Court held that the ICC's authority to assure
reasonable and non-discriminatory rates did not empower it to estab-
lish maximum rates to guarantee compliance after it held a carrier's
rate to be in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Court
viewed the ICC's action as an unauthorized attempt to prescribe a
rate for the future, explaining that it did not "find any provision of
the act that expressly, or by necessary implication, confers such a
power."' 20 The Court also reasoned that, except for express prohibi-
tions against unreasonable and discriminatory rates, carriers retained
the same powers that they possessed prior to passage of the Act:
[T]he act to regulate commerce leaves common carriers free as
they were at common law, free to make special contracts looking
use of injunctions in labor disputes); Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262
U.S. 522 (1923) (nullifying compulsory arbitration).
16. Id. at 61.
17. Id. at 75. In an earlier article, Justice Holmes had criticized the tendency of judges
to conceal the social and policy considerations underlying their decisions. Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 467-68 (1897).
18. See Pound, supra note 9, at 386.
19. 162 U.S. 184 (1896) [hereinafter referred to as the Maximum Freight Rate Case].
20. Id. at 196.
to the increase of their business, to classify their traffic, to adjust
and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of com-
merce, and generally to manage their important interests upon
the same principles which are regarded as sound, and adopted in
other trades and pursuits.2
Both the result and reasoning of this case reflect the Court's belief
that the ICC's power should be interpreted narrowly to preserve
property rights which carriers held at common law.
The ICC continued to argue that its authority over just and rea-
sonable rates impliedly empowered it to establish compliance rates
after discovering a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. In ICC
v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co.,22 the Supreme Court relied on its de-
cision in the Maximum Freight Rate Case and reversed an ICC or-
der which established a compliance rate to remedy violations of the
"long and short haul" provision of the Act. 23 The ICC unsuccessfully
argued that the Act was remedial and should be construed liberally
to achieve its purpose.2" Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion chided
the majority for its narrow construction:
Taken in connection with other decisions defining the powers of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the present decision, it
seems to me, goes far to make that Commission a useless body
for all practical purposes, and to defeat many of the important
objects designed to be accomplished by the various enactments
of Congress relating to Interstate Commerce. The Commission
was established to protect the public against the improper prac-
tices of transportation companies engaged in commerce among
the several states . . .. [I]t has been shorn, by judicial interpre-
tation, of authority to do anything of an effective character. It
has been denied many of the powers which, in my judgment,
were intended to be conferred upon it.2"
As a practical matter, these early precedents severely hampered
the ICC's efforts to enforce the Interstate Commerce Act. They left
the agency with authority to declare specific rates unreasonable but
without power to remedy the situation by adopting rates which com-
plied with the Act. Later commentators have concluded, as did Jus-
21. Id. at 197, quoting from ICC v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 43 F. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1890),
affd 145 U.S. 263 (1892).
22. 168 U.S. 144 (1897).
23. The long and short haul provision makes it unlawful for a carrier to charge a
higher rate for transporting passengers or goods for a shorter distance than for a longer dis-
tance over the same route. Id. at 166.
24. Id. at 149. After the New Deal, federal courts accepted this reasoning and adopted
a broad reading of implied powers. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941), and other cases discussed in Part Ill, infra.
25. Id. at 176.
tice Harlan, that these decisions emasculated the ICC.26 The Court
accomplished this result by limiting the ICC's authority to those
powers "expressly granted or necessarily implied" in order to mini-
mize governmental intrusion into rights which carriers held under
the common law.
In Pennsylvania, early court decisions involving implied powers
followed the same pattern as early federal cases. In Citizens' Passen-
ger Ry.' Co. v. Public Service Commission, 7 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the Public Service Commission lacked an im-
plied power to revise contracts of a transportation utility, except
where those contracts established rates for transportation. The court
reached this result by strictly construing the commission's statutory
powers:
The Public Service Company Law . . . like all others not in the
course of the common law and providing extra judicial remedies
• . . covers only such matters as are expressly or by necessary
implication included within its terms .... 2
The language limiting the commission to those powers which are
''expressly or by necessary implication" provided for in the statute is
virtually identical to the language used in the early federal court
decisions. The court applied this tight construction because the stat-
ute was not in accord with the common law.
In Swarthmore Borough v. Public Service Commission,29 the
court held that the commission lacked authority to relieve a public
service company of its contractual obligation to pave the streets
which it utilized. Again, the court emphasized that the commission's
powers must clearly appear in the statute."a Allowing the commis-
sion to exercise powers not contained in the statute would threaten
the management autonomy of regulated companies - a result which
the legislature did not intend:
26. W. MURPHY, supra note I1, at 44. J. SMITH AND P. MURPHY, Liberty and Justice,
Vol. II, 284-85, 291 (1968). The restrictive interpretation of the ICC's powers during this
period was noted in an infamous letter from the Attorney General to a railroad executive:
"The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the courts, is or can be made of
great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for government supervision, at the
same time that the supervision is almost entirely nominal." Letter from Richard S. Olney to
Charles C. Perkins (December 28, 1892), reprinted in J. SMITH AND P. MURPHY, supra, at
192-93.
27. 271 Pa. 39, 114 A. 642 (1921).
28. Id. at 54, 114 A. at 647-48. Accord State Board of Milk Control v. Richman Ice
Cream Co., 117 N.J. Eq. 296, 175 A. 796, 799 (1934); Petition of Boston & Maine Railroad,
82 N.H. 116, 129 A. 880 (1925).
29. 277 Pa. 472, 121 A. 488 (1923).
30. Id. at 478-79, 121 'A. at 489-90. Accord Day v. Public Service Commission, 312
Pa. 381, 167 A. 565 (1933); West Penn Rys. Co. v. Pennsylvnia Public Utility Commission,
135 Pa. Super. 89, 4 A.2d 545 (1939).
If the commission were allowed to exercise authority not con-
ferred on it, either in specific words or as necessarily compre-
hended in some other power expressly granted . . ., all the con-
tracts and the general management of the business of the public
utilities of Pennsylvania might, in course of time, be subjected to
the control of that body, although no such condition of affairs is
contemplated by the act . . . .The only safe and proper roads
for administrative bodies like the present commission to travel
are those plainly marked by the acts of assembly defining their
duties, and to these the courts must confine them, if the system
represented by such commissions - to which our body politic
seems committed - is to work out as intended by its creators,
the legislature.31
The court did not cite any evidence that the legislature intended a
narrow construction of the statute to preserve management's discre-
tion; it simply resolved its doubts in favor of property rights of the
utility and against the government's power to affect those rights.
Pennsylvania courts again applied a narrow construction to
powers of an administrative agency in Green v. Milk Control Com-
mission.32 The statute in question granted the commission authority
to fix minimum rates for the purchase of milk by dealers from pro-
ducers. In Green, the court held that the commission could not set
minimum rates where producers "consigned" milk to dealers, be-
cause the statute contained the words "purchase" and "buy" but did
not contain the word "consign. s3 3 The court refused to interpret
these terms flexibly and remarked, "The power and authority to be
exercised by administrative commissions must be conferred by legis-
lative language clear and unmistakable. A doubtful power does not
exist." 3' Justice Horace Stern dissented in Green, arguing that the
Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose - to
guarantee that producers earned sufficient revenue to maintain sani-
tary conditions.35 To achieve this important goal, he stated that the
act "should not be emasculated by unduly technical construction."36
The strict construction of reform statutes exhibited in the fore-
going decisions was criticized by some legal scholars of the era. Dean
31. Id. at 478, 121 A. at 489-90. It is difficult to imagine why a regulatory agency
would want to usurp the general management of a utility. Moreover, even under a liberal
reading of an agency's implied powers, those powers still must be exercised in accordance with
the purposes of the statute. See e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
32. 340 Pa. 1, 16 A.2d 9 (1940), cert. denied 312 U.S. 708 (1941).
33. Id. at 3, 16 A.2d at 9.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5-6, 16 A.2d at 10-11. Justice Stern's reasoning is similar to that currently
used by federal courts to justify a broad reading of the implied powers of federal administra-
tive agencies. See Part III, infra.
36. Id. at 9, 16 A.2d at 12.
Roscoe Pound argued that the tendency to strictly construe statutes
in derogation of the common law was rooted in unjustified contempt
which the American bench and bar held for social legislation:
It assumes that legislation is something to be deprecated. As no
statute of any consequence dealing with any relation of private
law can be anything but in derogation of the common law, the
social reformer and the legal reformer, under this doctrine, must
always face the situation that the legislative act which repre-
sents the fruit of their labors will find no sympathy in those who
apply it, will be construed strictly, and will be made to interfere
with the status quo as little as possible .
7
After an exhaustive inquiry into the history of the doctrine, Dean
Pound concluded that strict construction of social legislation
stemmed from obsolete rules of interpretation and that "[a]rchaic
interpretation, like any other feature of archiac law, is formal, rigid,
and arbitrary.
38
Justice Harlan F. Stone echoed Dean Pound's comments in crit-
icizing narrow construction of regulatory statutes:
We need to be reminded, too, that in the construction of statutes
establishing administrative agencies and defining their powers
there is little scope for the ancient shibboleth that a statute in
derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, or for
placing an emphasis on their particulars which will defeat their
obvious purpose. 9
Instead of a narrow, technical construction of regulatory statutes,
Justice Stone advocated a liberal construction to permit agencies to
achieve the goals for which they were created:
Legislatures create administrative agencies with the desire and
expectation that they will perform efficiently the tasks commit-
ted to them. That, at least, is one of the contemplated social
advantages to be weighed in resolving doubtful construction. It
is an aim so obvious as to make unavoidable the conclusion that
the function which courts are called upon to perform, in carry-
ing into operation such administrative schemes, is constructive,
not destructive, to make administrative agencies, wherever rea-
sonably possible, effective instruments for law enforcement, and
not to destroy them.
40
Stone's plea that the role of courts in construing administrative
schemes should be "constructive, not destructive" was not heeded in
37. Pound, supra note 9, at 387. See also Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 496-501.
38. Pound, supra note 9, at 396.
39. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 18 (1936).
40. Id.
decisions prior to the New Deal. Those decisions were designed to
maintain the status quo, not to foster effective performance of ad-
ministrative agencies.
Pennsylvania and federal courts, then, strictly construed implied
powers before the New Deal. Courts stated that agencies possessed
only those powers "expressly granted or necessarily implied" in their
respective enabling statutes and that attempts to exercise greater
power intruded upon management autonomy of regulated companies.
This construction was consistent with the trend in constitutional de-
cisions to limit government's powers to affect common law property
rights.
II. Federal Court Decisions Construing Implied Powers After the
New Deal
The attitude of federal courts toward reform legislation changed
dramatically in the late 1930's. Instead of attempting to further the
economic policy of laissez faire in their decisions, courts began to
accept social policies embraced by the executive and legislative
branches of government and embodied in reform statutes. This def-
erential attitude, like the earlier preference for laissez faire, affected
federal courts' interpretations of both the Constitution and reform
legislation. Federal courts began to interpret regulatory legislation
liberally and to extend the scope of implied powers of administrative
agencies.
Franklin D. Roosevelt took office as President in 1932 and im-
mediately set out to alter fundamentally the federal government's
role in the national economy. During his first four years in office,
however, his legislative initiatives were reviewed by a Supreme Court
which still believed that the Constitution incorporated notions of
rugged individualism, preeminence of property rights, and exclusive
state control over matters involving the general welfare of citizens.
The Supreme Court declared twelve major legislative acts un-
constitutional between January, 1935 and May, 1936.42 Some of
these decisions were based upon narrow readings of federal power
under the commerce clause.43 Other decisions struck down legisla-
tion under the theory that it contravened the substantive due process
right to "liberty of contract."" Whatever the legal basis for these
41. See B. Twiss, supra note 6, at 12-17, J. SMITH AND P. MURPHY, supra note 26, at
405-08.
42. J. SMITH AND P. MURPHY, supra note 26, at 406.
43. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act), United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the
Agricultural Adjustment Act).
44. See Morehead v. New York ex. rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invalidating
minimum wage legislation).
decisions, their result was to derail temporarily the President's pro-
gram for economic recovery. 5
Reacting to these decisions, President Roosevelt submitted his
infamous "court-packing" plan to Congress in 1937.48 Congress
eventually rejected his plan, but by that time its passage had become
unnecessary because the Supreme Court abruptly changed directions
and began to uphold the constitutionality of New Deal Legislation.47
The most dramatic decision of this period was the Court's rever-
sal of its position on the constitutionality of minimum wage legisla-
tion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.4 8 Seeds for a more deferen-
tial treatment of social legislation, however, had actually been
planted three years earlier in Nebbia v. New York."9 In Nebbia, the
Court upheld price regulation in the milk industry despite an argu-
ment that the law violated "liberty of contract" between buyers and
sellers of milk. The Court's opinion emphasized that formulation of
economic policy is primarily a responsibility of the legislature:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either
to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature,
to override it. 50
Requiring courts to accept legislatures' economic policies, except
where those policies contravene express language of the Constitution,
provided the framework for later court decisions upholding the con-
stitutionality of New Deal legislation. 1 The deference to legislative
policies which is apparent in Nebbia also formed the basis for a more
liberal interpretation of implied powers of administrative agencies in
subsequent years.
The Supreme Court demonstrated its receptive attitude toward
implied powers in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB.52 In Phelps Dodge,
the NLRB ordered an employer to reinstate and give back pay to
union members whom the employer had discriminated against. The
45. J. SMITH AND P. MURPHY, supra note 26, at 406.
46. A description of the plan and the President's reasons for proposing it are bluntly
stated in the "President's Radio Address on Judicial Reform," March 9, 1937. Excerpts from
the address are reprinted in J. SMITH & P. MURPHY, supra note 26, at 418-20.
47. See L, TRIBE, supra note 13, at 449-50.
48. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The legislation upheld in this case was virtually identical to
that struck down a year earlier in Morehead v. New York ex. rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936). See L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 450.
49. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
50. Id. at 537.
51. L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 450-55.
52. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
employer argued that the NLRB was not authorized by its enabling
act to order these remedies, but Justice Frankfurter's majority opin-
ion interpreted the Board's powers expansively to effectuate policies
of the act:
[C]ongress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems
for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the
whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies in an infi-
nite variety of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties
by leaving the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process
of administration.
53
In Justice Frankfurter's view, an interpretation designed to achieve
purposes of the act was necessary to avoid sliding "from the narrow
confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy. '" 4 Thus, the
deference to legislative policies articulated in the due process analy-
sis in Nebbia also formed the basis for a liberal construction of the
NLRB's implied powers in Phelps Dodge.
The Supreme Court validated the broad scope of implied powers
of the Federal Communications Commission in National Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc. v. United States.55 At issue were the FCC's "Chain
Broadcasting Regulations" which were designed to control the rela-
tionship between major broadcasting networks and their affiliated
stations. The Court upheld the regulations and dismissed the argu-
ment that the FCC was not empowered to regulate networks' prac-
tices in this area.
The theme in NBC is identical to that in Phelps
Dodge-implied powers should be upheld where they further policies
of regulatory legislation. Justice Frankfurter emphasized that Con-
gress could not be expected to draft an "itemized catalogue" of
problems that the FCC would confront, because any attempt at do-
ing so would have restricted the powers of the commission to details
in a field which was changing at a fast pace. 6 From this perspective,
Congress utilized broad language in the act because it intended the
FCC to have expansive powers to regulate in the public interest.
This reasoning contrasts sharply with pre-New Deal precedents
which preserved the status quo by viewing lack of specificity in stat-
utes as evidence that legislatures did not intend to delegate authority
to agencies. The Court's liberal interpretation of the statute in NBC
heeds Justice Stone's admonition that administrative statutes should
not be construed with such "an emphasis on their particulars which
53. Id. at 194.
54. Id.
55. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
56. Id. at 219.
will defeat their obvious purpose. 5 7
The acceptance of implied powers which the Court displayed in
Phelps Dodge and NBC was evident in other cases decided by the
Court during the nineteen forties and nineteen fifties. Two of these
cases involved the implied powers of the ICC. In United States v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.., 58 the Court upheld an ICC order re-
quiring a railroad to interchange its cars with a connecting water
carrier. The ICC was not precluded from ordering interconnection
merely because this power was not specifically mentioned in the In-
terstate Commerce Act. The Court reasoned that the complexity of
the subject led Congress to draft the statute in general terms and
allow details to be worked out by the administrative process.59 Simi-
larly, in American Trucking Association, Inc. v. United States,0 the
Court affirmed the ICC's regulations governing equipment leasing
practices of regulated motor carriers. Lack of express statutory au-
thority for the ICC to regulate leasing practices was not fatal to the
regulations. The Court noted that legislative draftsmen do not con-
sider every potential evil and that requiring express authorization for
every regulatory initiative would demand a legislative "prescience"
which does not exist. 61
In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 2 the Supreme
Court upheld FCC regulations which provided that station licenses
would not be granted if the applicant had an interest in other sta-
tions beyond a limited number. Although the power asserted in these
regulations was not stated in the Communications Act, the Court
again cited compelling policy reasons for liberally construing the
FCC's implied powers:
The growing complexity of our economy induced the Congress
to place regulation of businesses like communication in special-
ized agencies with broad powers. Courts are slow to interfere
with their conclusions when reconcilable with statutory direc-
tives [citations omitted]. We think the Multiple Ownership
Rules, as adopted, are reconcilable with the Communications
Act as a whole.63
The rules were "reconcilable" with the Communications Act because
nothing in the act prohibited them. In contrast, pre-New Deal deci-
sions did not analyze whether a given power was "reconcilable" with
57. Stone, supra note 39, at 18.
58. 323 U.S. 612 (1945).
59. Id. at 616.
60. 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
61. Id. at 309-10.
62. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
63. Id. at 203-04.
the act but examined only whether the power was expressly granted
by the act. Storer stands for the proposition that implied powers are




A more explicit statement of the rationale of Storer is contained
in two circuit court cases which construed the scope of implied pow-
ers of the Federal Power Commission (FPC). In Public Service
Commission of the State of New York v. FPC,65 the court held that
the FPC's authority to issue temporary certificates in "emergencies"
was not limited to situations involving "maintenance of adequate ser-
vice or (service to) particular customers," as provided in the Natural
Gas Act.66 The court boldly stated that "[a]ll authority of the com-
mission need not be found in explicit language." 67 It also reasoned
that the FPC's "necessary and proper" powers enabled it to deal
with unforeseen problems and to use means not specifically detailed
in the act, so long as the means utilized conformed with the terms
and objectives of the act.68 Similarly, in Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp. v. FPC,69 the court upheld the FPC's retroactive application of
administrative fees where the utility had withheld for several years
information upon which the fees were based. The court rejected ap-
pellant's argument that the retroactive remedy was not specifically
authorized by the act, noting that the act "is not to be given a tight
reading wherein every action . . . is justified only if referable to ex-
press statutory authorization. ' 7  The court also stressed that the
FPC was granted broad powers to regulate in light of changing
conditions.
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The Supreme Court continued the federal trend of broadly con-
struing implied powers in FPC v. Texaco Inc.7 12 At issue was the
FPC's plan to replace direct regulation of small gas producers with a
64. One advantage of this approach is that it gives an agency flexibility to respond to
changes in the industry it regulates without the necessity of repetitive legislation. A later fed-
eral decision explicitly stated that the Communications Act should be interpreted to avoid the
need for repetitive legislation, because "[tlo do otherwise in regulating a dynamic public ser-
vice function such as broadcasting would place an intolerable regulatory burden on the Con-
gress-one which it sought to escape by delegating administrative functions to the Commis-
sion." General Telephone Co. of California v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See
also FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); American Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951); C. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
726 (1984).
65. 327 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
66. Id. at 896. The court reasoned that the quoted language had a special relationship
to the FPC's regulation of gas pipelines, whereas the instant case involved a gas producer.
67. Id. at 897.
68. Id.
69. 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
70. Id. at 158.
71. Id.
72. 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
scheme of "indirect" regulation.7 The Court affirmed the FPC's au-
thority to implement this type of regulatory scheme because nothing
in the Natural Gas Act "proscribes the kind of indirect regulation
undertaken here."
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Even under the liberal approach followed by federal courts, the
implied powers of federal administrative agencies are not unlimited.
For example, in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,75 the Supreme Court
reversed an FCC order which required cable television operators to
make certain channels available for public access. The FCC argued
that the rules were permissible because they were designed to further
objectives of the Communications Act--diverse programming and
local expression. The Court, however, viewed imposition of public ac-
cess obligations as tantamount to foisting common carrier obligations
upon cable television operators, an action which ran afoul of the
act's specific policy of preserving "the journalistic freedom of persons
engaged in broadcasting."'7" Thus, the Court reconciled divergent
policies of the act and found that the rules were, in fact, contrary to
those policies.77
The key to the federal decisions interpreting implied powers af-
ter the New Deal is their acceptance of policies inherent in regula-
tory legislation. This deference to Congressional policy was also re-
sponsible for the Supreme Court's more flexible interpretation of the
Constitution to uphold New Deal legislation. In cases involving im-
plied powers, federal courts recognized that Congress created regula-
tory agencies to tackle difficult tasks and that Congress intended to
give agencies the tools to fulfill their missions.
III. State Court Decisions Interpreting Implied Powers After the
New Deal
The previous section reveals that federal courts have liberally
construed implied powers of federal administrative agencies since the
73. Under "indirect" regulation, the FPC would examine the price that pipelines were
paying for gas from small producers and would then compare that price to the prevailing
market price for gas. Id. at 382-86.
74. Id. at 387. The Court, however, remanded the case to the FPC to clarify whether
the Commission was improperly equating market prices with "reasonable rates."
75. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
76. Id. at 707.
77. The Court's opinion has been cited by one commentator as evidence that federal
courts will not look to objectives of an enabling act in determining the scope of an agency's
authority. Pond, Restraining Regulatory Activism: The Proper Scope of Public Utility Regu-
lation, 35 AD. L. REV. 423, 446-48 (1983). This interpretation goes too far-the Court simply
found that the FCC's rules did not advance the true objectives of the Communications Act.
The proposition that statutes should be interpreted in light of their objectives is widely ac-
cepted. See, e.g., Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3
VAND. L. REv. 470 (1950); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Questions of Law, 69 HARv. L. REv. 230
(1955).
New Deal. State courts, however, still generally adhere to earlier
precedents which established a narrow reading of the scope of im-
plied powers.
In Pennsylvania, courts departed from their pre-New Deal pref-
erence for strict construction and adopted a broad reading of implied
powers of the Public Utility Commission in Duquesne Light Com-
pany v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.8 In Duquesne, the
court upheld a new rate formulated by the commission for providing
electricity and interconnecting circuits to a municipal lighting sys-
tem. The utility had previously provided a lighting system as well as
electricity to power it. The utility argued that the commission did
not have authority to reclassify the utility's service and establish the
new rate. The court, however, construed the commission's powers
broadly and upheld the order:
The jurisdiction assumed by the Commission, and its orders in
this case were necessary and proper in the exercise of the powers
granted to it in the Public Utility Law, and it is unimportant
that the legislature . . . may not have contemplated the specific
factual situation here presented. The authority conferred by the
Act includes powers which are necessary and proper, in addition
to those specifically declared, for the regulation of the service




This reasoning is similar to the rationale used by federal courts to
justify a broad reading of implied powers. It recognizes that legisla-
tors cannot foresee every problem that will arise in administering a
statute and gives regulators flexibility to resolve these problems. The
court's recognition of powers which are "necessary and proper" for
regulating utility rates and service follows the federal pattern of lib-
erally construing implied powers to effectuate goals of regulatory
legislation.
Pennsylvania courts again interpreted the Public Utility Com-
mission's implied powers broadly in Sonafelt v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission.80 Here, an applicant for bus operating authority
objected to the rescission of an order permitting it to commence ser-
vice. The applicant argued that the commission's authority to rescind
orders was limited to three situations expressly provided for in the
statute and that none of these sections applied to his case. The court
rejected these arguments, advocating a "liberal construction" of the
statute and stating that "[tihe Commission was granted broad pow-
78. 164 Pa. Super. 166, 63 A.2d 466 (1949).
79. Id. at 172-73, 63 A.2d at 469-70.
80. 175 Pa. Super. 164, 103 A.2d 442 (1954).
ers to effect the legislative intent."'"
Five years later, however, Pennsylvania courts inexplicably re-
turned to a strict construction of the commission's implied powers in
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commis-
sion.82 In this case, the court nullified regulations requiring passen-
ger trains to obtain the Public Utility Commission's approval prior to
implementing schedule changes. Absent a showing of abuse of mana-
gerial discretion, scheduling remained a responsibility of manage-
ment with which the commission was powerless to interfere. The
commission could not require prior approval because the legislature
had not expressly granted it this authority. The court commented,
"We are convinced that the 'unprecedented' requirement of prior ap-
proval of such schedule changes is an extension of the power of the
Commission which is unwarranted by the Public Utility Law, and
that the new regulation is legislation rather than rule making." 8
Like pre-New Deal precedents, Pennsylvania R.R. Co. espouses the
theory that the statute was drafted with an intent to preserve man-
agement's autonomy over all matters except those expressly placed
within the commission's jurisdiction.
The approach of Pennsylvania courts to interpreting implied
powers is unclear after Pennsylvania R.R. Co., because two conflict-
ing canons of construction have received judicial support. This con-
fusion has resurfaced in recent years as an upheaval in the electric
and gas industries forced regulators in Pennsylvania and elsewhere
to search for new tools to assure adequate utility service at reasona-
ble rates. Specifically, the scope of implied powers of public utility
commissions was a key factor in state court decisions involving two
issues-regulatory authority to mandate energy conservation pro-
grams and regulatory authority to intervene in construction of elec-
tric generating plants.
Pennsylvania courts have generally upheld the Public Utility
Commission's decisions involving energy conservation issues. 84 In Al-
lied Development and Building Corporation v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission,85 the court upheld the commission's approval of
a gas utility's tariff which contained penalties for gas usage exceed-
81. Id. at 169-70, 103 A.2d at 445.
82. 187 Pa. Super. 590, 146 A.2d 352 (1958), rev'd on other grounds 396 Pa. 34, 152
A.2d 422 (1959).
83. 187 Pa. Super. at 603, 146 A.2d at 358.
84. Efforts by regulators to require energy conservation measures by utilities arise from
a desire to preserve finite natural resources and to avoid the large rate increases necessary to
pay for new electric generating units. See generally Carvalho, Energy Conservation Through
the State Public Utility Commissions, 3 HARV. ENVT'L. L. REV. 160 (1979).
85. 60 Pa. Commw. 207, 430 A.2d 1239 (1981), allocatur denied (225 W.D. Pa. Misc.
DKT. 1981, filed Nov. 18, 1981).
ing an allocated amount. The court reasoned that the commission's
general power to supervise and regulate utilities, along with its au-
thority over the adequacy of a utility's service, empowered it to cur-
tail natural gas usage.86 Similarly, in Crown American Corporation
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,87 the court upheld the
commission's ban on master metering at new multi-tenancy commer-
cial locations, a measure which was designed to promote conserva-
tion by making each tenant aware of his actual energy usage. In
upholding the order, the court again relied on the commission's "ple-
nary jurisdiction" and "broad authority to supervise and regulate all
utilities within the Commonwealth." 88 In Pennsylvania Builders As-
sociation v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,9 the court up-
held the commission's requirement that new homes comply with
specified insulation standards as a precondition to receiving electric
service. Specifically, the court stated that "[a] regulatory agency
may have implied powers, with respect to matters not specifically
stated in the enabling statute, if they are within the legislative intent
(citation omitted)."90 Although it upheld the commission's order, the
court did not articulate why it believed that the implied power exer-
cised here was within the legislative intent.
The cases discussed in the previous paragraph liberally con-
strued the Public Utility Commission's implied power to promote en-
ergy conservation. The confusion over the proper method of inter-
preting implied powers resurfaced, however, in Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,1 an-
other case involving conservation issues. The commission, pursuant
to a federal law which mandated protection for residential and small
business customers from rate increases due to decontrol of natural
gas prices, ordered gas utilities to accumulate a fund for a residen-
tial conservation program. The court upheld the commission's re-
quirement that the fund be expended for a conservation program,
even though it did not believe that the commission could have cre-
ated the fund without the federal law. In upholding the creation of
the conservation program, the court cited Duquesne Light Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission92 in support of a broad
86. Id. at 212, 430 A.2d at 1241.
87. 76 Pa. Commw. 305, 463 A.2d 1257 (1983), allocatur denied (93 M.D. Pa. Alloca-
tur DKT. 1983, filed Nov. 15, 1985).
88. Id. at 309, 463 A.2d at 1259.
89. 85 Pa. Commw. 604, 483 A.2d 1025 (1984), allocatur granted (5 M.D. Allocatur
DKT., filed May 29, 1985).
90. Id. at 608, 483 A.2d at 1027.
91. 84 Pa. Commw. 76, 480 A.2d 1273 (1984), allocatur granted (129 M.D. Pa. Allo-
catur DKT., filed Feb. 3, 1985).
92. 164 Pa. Super. 166, 63 A.2d 466 (1949).
reading of the commission's "necessary powers."93 But the court also
endorsed strict construction of implied powers by explaining that the
commission could not have created the fund without the federal law.
The court remarked, "It is axiomatic that the Commission, as an
agency of delegated powers created by the legislature, has only those
powers explicit in the enabling statute, the Pennsylvania Public Util-
ity Code (citation omitted) or fairly to be implied as necessary to the
exercise of those express powers (citations omitted)."9 ' Thus, the
court relied on two conflicting interpretations of the commission's
powers in the same case!
Utility regulators in other states have experienced mixed results
in defending conservation programs before state courts. In Consoli-
dated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Com-
mission,95 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a commission or-
der banning advertising by electric utilities designed to stimulate
consumption of electricity. The court's opinion cited contradictory
methods of construing the commission's implied powers. While recit-
ing that the commission had only those powers expressly delegated
along with those required by necessary implication,90 the court up-
held the commission's order by relying on a broad reading of the
commission's powers.
Nevertheless, the absence of explicit statutory authorization
need not be fatal to a given assertion of regulatory power by the
commission . . . . [T]he Legislature on occasion broadly de-
clares its will, specifying only the goals to be achieved and poli-
cies to be promoted, while leaving the implementation of a pro-
gram to be worked out by an administrative body . . . . In such
cases, the sheer breadth of delegated authority precludes a pre-
cise demarcation of the line beyond which the agency may not
tread. What is called for, rather, is a realistic appraisal of the
particular situation to determine whether the administrative ac-
tion reasonably promotes or transgresses the pronounced legisla-
tive judgment (citations omitted).9
This language is very similar to that currently used by federal courts
to justify a broad reading of implied powers of federal administrative
agencies.
93. 84 Pa. Commw. at 88, 480 A.2d at 1280.
94. Id. at 86-7, 480 A.2d at 1279. As noted in Part I, supra, this interpretation origi-
nally grew out of the judiciary's desire to protect private property rights from government
regulation. This traditional construction of the statute seems to run afoul of the present canon
of construction that the legislature is presumed to intend "to favor the public interest as
against any private interest." I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(5) (1975).
95. 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749 (1979) rev'd on other grounds sub nom Central
Hudson Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
96. 47 N.Y.2d at 102, 390 N.E.2d at 752.
97. Id. at 102, 390 N.E.2d at 752-53.
Other state courts have reversed attempts by regulators to stim-
ulate conservation. In Southern California Gas Company v. Public
Utilities Commission,98 the California Supreme Court struck down a
commission decision which ordered electric and gas utilities to pro-
vide loans to customers in order to finance conservation measures.
The commission argued that the program was within its general reg-
ulatory powers. The court, however, noted the approval of legislation
which only required the commission to "permit" utility financing of
conservation measures and stated that "the express authorization of
a permissive program impliedly precludes any authority to impose a
mandatory program." 9" It is ironic that a law clearly intended to
promote conservation should be read to restrict the commission's
powers to adopt even more beneficial conservation programs. 00
While the court did not articulate a theory for construing implied
powers, its reasoning belies a reluctance to recognize policy-making
powers of the commission.
In Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company v. Iowa State Com-
merce Commission,101 the court reversed a commission order requir-
ing utilities to act as lenders of last resort to enable residential cus-
tomers to conserve energy. The court ruled that legislation which
gave the commission jurisdiction to promote use of energy conserva-
tion strategies by utilities did not authorize the commission to re-
quire utility financing of conservation measures. The court noted
that other states had approved legislation expressly requiring utilities
to offer financing and stated that express legislative authority would
be necessary to support "such a departure from traditional utilities
regulation." °'0 The court, therefore, relied on the legislature, not the
commission, as the primary source of innovative programs.
The District of Columbia Public Service Commission narrowly
construed its own powers in deciding that it lacked authority to order
utilities to provide loans for conservation purposes.'0 3 The commis-
sion held that the power to require utility financing was not "ex-
pressly granted or necessarily implied" in the statute. 04
98. 156 Cal. Rptr. 733, 596 P.2d 1149 (1979).
99. Id. at 736, 596 P.2d at 1152.
100. Pennsylvania courts rejected similar reasoning in Pennsylvania Builders Association
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 502 Pa. 87, 464 A.2d 321 (1983). The court held
that legislation requiring specific insulation levels in new homes did not preclude the commis-
sion from adopting more stringent standards than those contained in the legislation.
101. 334 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1983).
102. Id. at 754.
103. Re: Residential Energy Conservation Policy Act, 48 P.U.R.4th 575 (D.C. Public
Service Commission 1982). But see Blumrosen, Toward Effective Administration of New Reg-
ulatory Statutes, 29 AD. L. REV. 87, 95-97 (1977) (advocating a requirement that administra-
tors interpret their organic statutes broadly).
104. 48 P.U.R.4th at 585.
Interpretation of implied powers has also been an issue in sev-
eral recent cases involving attempts by regulators to halt construc-
tion of nuclear power plants.' In Pennsylvania Public Utility Com-
mission v. Philadelphia Electric Company,106 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ruled that the commission could block a utility's efforts
to sell securities to raise capital for completing an electric generating
plant. The court reasoned that statutory language authorizing the
commission to examine whether registration of a utility's securities
was "necessary or proper" for present and probable future capital
needs of the utility empowered the commission to examine factors
relating to the wisdom of completing the plant. 10 7 This power was
conceded to be a "severe intrusion" into management decisions, but
the court recognized that utilities are subject to a comprehensive sys-
tem of government regulation. 0 8 Other state courts which consid-
ered this question narrowly construed regulatory authority over se-
curities issuances and reached a different conclusion. 10 9
While upholding the commission's order, the court hinted in
dicta that the commission did not have authority to order the utility
to halt construction of the plant. This conclusion followed from the
court's statement that "absent express legislative authority, the
(Commission) is powerless to interfere with the general management
decisions of public utility companies." ' This narrow statement of
the commission's general powers is difficult to reconcile with the
court's expansive reading of the commission's authority to reject util-
ity securities filings.
111
105. Efforts by commissions to halt construction of generating plants arise from the be-
lief that plants are not needed and from a desire to prevent large rate increases necessary to
pay for completed plants. See generally, Pierce, supra note 2, at 508-11. While regulators
could, theoretically, respond to the situation by refusing to allow a utility to recover its invest-
ment in a completed plant from customers, they rarely do so because of the difficulty of prov-
ing that the utility acted imprudently and because of the financial effect on the utility of
excluding a substantial portion of the plant's costs from the rate base. Id. at 511-12, Carvalho,
supra note 85, at 166.
106. 501 Pa. 153, 460 A.2d 734 (1983).
107. The court's opinion mentions several relevant factors, including the effect of com-
pleting the plant on the utility's service and rates, the financial condition of the utility, and the
need for the plant. Id. at 160-61, 460 A.2d at 738. The opinion is unclear as to whether all of
these factors must be shown to justify rejection of a securities certificate.
108. Id. at 161, 460 A.2d at 738-39.
109. See Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. State, 645 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1982); Kelly v.
Michigan Public Service Commission, 412 Mich. 385, 316 N.W.2d 187 (1982); Appeal of
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 122 N.H. 1062, 454 A.2d 435 (1982).
110. Philadelphia Electric, 501 Pa. at 159, 460 A.2d at 737, citing Swarthmore Borough
v. Public Service Commission, 277 Pa. 472, 478, 121 A. 488, 489-90 (1923).
111. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had reversed commission's order, rea-
soning that since the commission did not have authority to cancel the plant, it could not ac-
complish this result indirectly by blocking issuance of securities. Philadelphia Electric Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 71 Pa. Commw. 424, 455 A.2d 1244 (1983), rev'd
501 Pa. 153, 460 A.2d 734 (1984). The Commonwealth Court's opinion contains a detailed
discussion of cases which strictly construed the commission's implied powers; however, the
Courts in other states have barred regulators from intervening,
directly or indirectly, in construction of nuclear power plants. In Ap-
peal of Public Service Company of New Hampshire,'12 the court
reversed a commission order which prohibited a utility from applying
proceeds of a securities issuance to fund construction of a nuclear
power plant. The court supported its conclusion by pointing out that
the commission "is endowed with only the powers and authority
which are expressly granted or fairly implied by statute.""' The
court also noted that "owners of a utility do not surrender to the
commission their rights to manage their own affairs merely by devot-
ing their private business to a public use."' 14
In Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. State,15 the court
reversed a decision by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission which
barred a utility from issuing securities to fund construction of a nu-
clear power plant. The court reasoned that the commission possessed
only those powers which were "expressly or by necessary implication
conferred upon it" and that the power sought by the commission
would interfere with the utility's "management prerogatives.""'  In
support of its narrow interpretation of the securities section of the
statute, the court quoted a 1917 precedent:
Business initiative and business sagacity are left free to improve
what they deem to be opportunities, and a public utility has the
right, under the statute, to issue whatever bonds and stocks may
be necessary to carry out corporate powers, acquire property,
construct and extend facilities, and maintain and improve ser-
vice. The commission has no discretion to refuse to certify such
securities.
1 7
Three justices dissented, arguing that the majority's interpretation of
the securities section conflicted with both legislative intent and the
commission's general powers to "supervise and regulate the public
duties and obligations of public utilities."" 8
State courts in the post-New Deal era, then, have generally con-
court did not discuss historical roots of strict construction, nor did it analyze effects of limiting
the commission's power to respond to changing conditions in utility industries.
112. 122 N.H. 1062, 454 A.2d 435 (1982).
113. Id. at -, 454 A.2d at 437, citing Petition of Boston & Maine Railroad, 82 N.H.
116, 129 A. 880 (1925).
114. 122 N.H. at __, 454 A.2d at 437-38, citing Grafton County Electric Light &
Power Co., 77 N.H. 539, 94 A. 193 (1915). As an alternative basis for reversing the commis-
sion's order, the court found that the commission had deprived the utility of its constitutionally
vested right to complete the construction project. Id. at -, 454 A.2d at 438-41.
115. 645 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1982).
116. Id. at 466.
117. Id. at 467, quoting from Kansas City, K.V.&W. Ry. Co. v. Bristow, 101 Kan. 557,
167 P. 1138 (1917).
118. 645 P.2d at 468.
tinued to apply narrow readings to implied powers of public utility
commissions. These courts frequently support their interpretation by
citing pre-New Deal cases which reflect a judicial preference for
laissez faire in both constitutional and statutory construction. The
principle of liberal construction has found some support in Pennsyl-
vania and New York decisions, but neither state has clearly rejected
the contrary principle of strict construction.
IV. Conclusion
This article has examined two conflicting approaches to inter-
preting the scope of implied powers of regulatory agencies. State
courts still tend to construe implied powers narrowly, reasoning that
those powers which are not expressly granted in statutes have pre-
sumably been withheld by legislatures. Federal courts, on the other
hand, have interpreted implied powers of federal agencies liberally
since the New Deal, explaining that those powers which are not ex-
pressly barred by statutes are presumed to exist if they will effectu-
ate the purposes of enabling legislation.
The narrow construction of implied powers by state courts is
unsound for several reasons. First, an examination of history reveals
that this construction arose from the judiciary's dogmatic preference
for laissez faire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In constitutional law, this same preference for laissez faire over gov-
ernment intervention led to an unprecedented conflict between the
executive and judicial branches of government and discredited judi-
cial review in the public's eyes.119 Federal courts recognized this di-
lemma and began to interpret implied powers of federal agencies
broadly while simultaneously discarding regressive constitutional
doctrines. Since it is not appropriate for state courts to impose the
theory of laissez faire in their decisions, they should follow the fed-
eral approach of broadly construing implied powers.
Second, a narrow construction of implied powers of regulatory
agencies is contrary to legislative intent because it hampers the abil-
ity of agencies to carry out the purposes for which they were created.
Federal courts interpreted implied powers broadly after the New
Deal because they wanted to effectuate purposes of regulatory legis-
lation. Early federal and state court decisions narrowly construing
implied powers, on the other hand, were designed to minimize effects
of social legislation upon the common law property rights of regu-
lated industries.
Clearly, an interpretation of implied powers which effectuates
119. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Ex-
humation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34 L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 446-49, 453.
objectives of enabling legislation is consistent with the intent of legis-
latures. Evidence of legislative intent is not found by scrutinizing
particulars of regulatory statutes; 12 0 rather, it is predicated upon an
understanding of the reasons for which regulatory agencies were cre-
ated. As Justice Frankfurter recognized in his scholarly writings and
court opinions, agencies were created to perform a task which
neither courts nor legislatures could accomplish-to regulate the
practices of industries in a rapidly changing world. 12' Thus, the
pragmatic considerations which led to the creation of these agencies
also support a liberal reading of their implied powers.
Third, strict construction of implied powers deprives the public
of benefits of effective government. Requiring legislation whenever a
court perceives a gap in an agency's power forces legislators into a
regulatory role which they sought to escape by creating agencies. 2
Regulatory agencies have both expertise on regulatory issues and a
greater ability to determine when new policies or procedures are re-
quired. If policies of regulatory agencies are not in accord with those
of legislatures the legislatures can change laws or use other tools to
check the errant regulators.
2 3
The discussion in this section applies with particular force to
construction of implied powers of state public utility commissions. At
a time when rapid changes in the public utility industries are chal-
lenging these commissions to adopt innovative policies and proce-
dures, it is critical that state courts recognize implied powers which
furthering the statutory goals of adequate service and reasonable
rates. As one observer of the administrative process wrote over forty
years ago:
Whereas precedent, like habit, makes for stability, the adminis-
trative process is geared to the dynamic conditions of today,
which require a stability more resilient and adaptable to change
and complexity than dogmatic attitudes and traditional proce-
dures can provide. Legal formalism leads to the rigid crystalliza-
tion of administrative practice whose prime requisite is flexibil-
ity to meet many variable circumstances equitably and
120. There is, however, some evidence of this intent in language granting "necessary and
proper" powers to agencies. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com-
mission, 164 Pa. Super. 166, 63 A.2d 466 (1949); Public Service Commission of the State of
New York v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
121. Frankfurter, supra note 5; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941);
National Broadcasting Commission v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
122. See, e.g., General Telephone Co. of California v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 398 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
123. Examples of these "other tools" are control over agencies' budgets, control over
renewal of agencies' powers pursuant to a "sunset" review, and legislative review of agencies'
regulations. See W. GELLHORN. C. BYSE, AND P. STRAUSS, Administrative Law 103-26 (7th ed.
1979).
efficiently . . . . The central need is not to obstruct government
as baneful.
12'
Recent state court decisions strictly construing implied powers
of state public utility commissions are based upon a philosophy
which federal courts justly repudiated almost fifty years ago. It is
time for state courts to adopt a liberal interpretation of implied pow-
ers and to reject the legacy of laissez faire.
124. B. Twiss, supra note 6 at 262 (emphasis in original). The need to improve adapta-
bility to changing economic conditions has been cited as "the great challenge" to public utility
regulation. C. Phillips, supra note 65 at 746. Moreover, legal precedent when viewed in its
proper role, should permit adaptation to changing conditions. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture II (1921).
